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Sum ma ry
This paper presents how monetary policy, restricted only by price stability, may easily
become propitious to asset inflation and – eventually – to a financial crisis. This risk is
particularly high when the financial system lacks proper regulation and effective
supervision. Hasty liberalization, negligence of official oversight and „Greenspan
doctrine” which refuted any activist policy promoting financial stability characterized
Fed’s monetary policy under the former Fed’s governor. The paper also analyses another
aspect of the linkages between monetary policy and financial crises – monetary policy
reaction to financial crises. It is not surprising that it consists of cutting interest rates
and bail-out of insolvent, systemically important financial institutions. Such policy,
especially when run too long and changed too abruptly, not only creates moral hazards
but it also sets the stage for another „search for yield” and build-up of another
speculative bubble. As a result, monetary policy becomes asymmetric and pro-cyclical.
Fed’s reaction to the recent crisis seems to be very much in line with this pattern typical
of Fed’s policy in the past. However, this time the scale of flooding the economy with
liquidity and – as a consequence – the risks of future major imbalances in the financial
system are unprecedented. A general conclusion of the paper says that there can’t be
a sound financial and economic system unless money itself is a scarce resource. However
trivial this statement is, monetary policy of some central banks seems to miss the point.
Introduction
There is broad literature on the subject whether central banks should react to – and
are able to identify – any signs of financial misalignments or asset price bubbles. The
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* Dr  hab.,  prof.  nadzw.,  Wyż sza  Szko ła  Fi nan sów  i Za rzą dza nia  w Sie dl cach. answers provided have been different. The axis of the problem is the dilemma: is price
stability enough or should central banks pursue monetary policy in a more compound
manner. After more than a decade of the dominance of direct inflation targeting – explicit
or implicit – this question is now more important than ever. I am inclined to share the
opinions that monetary policy may be lax even though it guaranties price stability. The
result may be fuelling a speculative mania. Moreover, another aspect of monetary policy
is the way a central bank reacts to a financial crisis and financial instability. In these days
central banks run their policy under the pressure of the dynamic circumstances of financial
instability rather than inspired by an intellectual reflection. The result is not a lax monetary
policy any more, this is a helicopter money policy. Is it possible to have a sound financial
system and strong economy where money is for nothing?
The aim of this paper is to reconsider a negative role that monetary policy can play
in dismantling reasonable incentives and restrictions in the investment process. This is
a policy paper which is practically oriented. It is intended to reassess the present dominant
pattern of monetary policy which in good times is single-mindedly oriented at price
stability and in times of a crisis it is predominantly devoted to the supply of virtually
unlimited liquidity to avoid a collapse of the financial system, credit crunch and recession.
The paper does not build upon any „stylized facts”, it looks just at facts, particularly at
the American experience which is the clearest and most meaningful. Of course,
interpretation of the facts may not necessarily be obvious. However, any modeling would
not help much in this respect. In the paper I give an example of an academic model where
a naïve presumption leads to fault results. Due to the scope of the data and the character
of the phenomena analyzed, quantitative analysis does not seem to provide decisive
insights, either, although some useful efforts are made (ex. Mishkin and White, 2002).
This paper is organized as follows; the next, second part briefly presents the reasons
for financial crises. It does not provide extensive answers, it rather sets the stage for the
main issue. The third part presents the discussion on the role of monetary policy in the face
of financial imbalances and it claims that – having not reacted correctly – monetary policy
may fuel a speculative mania. The fourth part tries to establish a link between the way
central banks used to manage financial instability and creating prerequisites for another
crisis. It also describes in this context the recent steps taken by the Fed. The paper
concludes with a short summary. 
1. What are the reasons for financial distress?
An answer to the question about the reasons for financial distress may be trivial. The
substance of any financial crisis is an immense and rapid decline in the value of a category
of assets. Such a decline is a result of an earlier asset price bubble when the prices were
not justified by fundamental factors ( incomes which these assets could be reasonably
expected to provide). Shortly speaking, the reason is always „irrational exuberance” using
Greenspan’s terminology or a „speculative mania” according to Kindleberger.
Such an explanation, however trivial, is in contradiction to the efficient market
hypothesis. It is not the purpose of this paper to discredit the hypothesis; it is clear that in
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of financial markets. This is a matter of fact. However, an explanation why markets are
not efficient and „irrational exuberance” or „speculative manias” happen is not so trivial
any more. This is, first of all, subject to the behavioral theory of finance. Leaving apart
academic theories let’s take here for granted that investors not necessarily make rational
decisions and markets not always, if ever, are effective. Asset price bubbles are
a phenomenon difficult to deny. Instead of analyzing in what regard human beings are not
perfectly rational let’s try to identify factors propitious to build-up of financial imbalances. 
Firstly, keeping in mind the purpose of the paper, it is useful to notice that speculative
manias took place under the gold standard, too; consider the „tulip mania” in Holland in
the 17th century or the collapse of the East India Company in England. It proves that an
active interest rate policy of a modern central bank is not a necessary condition for a crisis.
However, it does not say that monetary policy can’t be a propitious or even sufficient
factor to bring about financial distress. 
Secondly, the risk of a financial crisis is to be diminished by proper regulations of the
financial market. Generally, the need for regulatory restrictions is not questioned.
However, the regulations restraining some activities create incentives to look for
loopholes. A good example is given by Engdahl (2008, V): „The original intent of the
Basle Accord was to force banks to reduce lending risk. The actual effect for US banks
was just the opposite. They soon discovered a gaping loophole – off-balance-sheet
transactions, notably derivation positions and securitization.” As an effect of securitization
„the lending bank now no longer had to worry if the loan would ever be repaid.”
Regulation not only creates incentives for financial institutions to look for loopholes
but it also makes regulators wonder about the trade-off between making markets safer or
making them more effective and credit less expensive. A devoted advocate of financial
liberalization was Greenspan as the governor of the Fed. In particular, Greenspan’s
opinion presented in 1987 to the US House of Representatives Committee on Banking
clearly shows what was his choice concerning the trade-off : „…repeal of Glass-Steagall
would provide significant public benefits consistent with a manageable increase in risk”
(Engdahl, 2008, III). Greenspan repeated this mantra until final repeal of the act in 1999.
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was intended, broadly speaking, to restrict commercial
banks from speculative investing in risky assets and from resulting conflicts of interests
which laid behind the crash of 1929. According to Kuttner (2007) „since repeal of
Glass-Steagall in 1999 (…) super-banks have been able to re-enact the same kinds of
structural conflicts that were endemic in 1920s”. 
Another example of liberalization of the financial market in the US is the decision by
the Fed in 1974 to lower to 50% the margin requirements for the purchase of stocks on
credit (Regulation T) – the requirement had been at 100% since 1934. Even in the face
of the dot.com bubble Greenspan repeatedly refused to change the stock margin
requirements, although „influential observers, including financier George Soros and
Stanley Fisher, deputy director at the IMF, advocated that the FED let the air out of the
credit boom by raising margin requirements” (Engdahl, 2008, III).
These remarks, far from an extensive discussion of financial regulation and
liberalization, only illustrate the role which proper regulations play in restricting a conflict
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were good regulations in place, any financial crisis would be less probable or less severe. 
Moreover, proper regulation must be accompanied by effective supervision. It was
clearly missing in the case of the huge sale of non-delivery forward currency contracts by
Russian banks before the Russian crisis in 1998 or in the case of the Madoff affair when
the Securities and Exchange Commission did not undertake necessary activities. It is true
that financial markets become more and more complicated and difficult to control
(especially when loosely regulated). This observation may result in defeatist attitudes.
Engdahl (2008, IV) quotes Greenspan who said: „It is, thus, all the more important to
recognize that twenty-first century financial regulation is going to increasingly have to
rely on private counterparty surveillance to achieve safety and soundness. There is no
credible way to envision most government financial regulation being other than oversight
of the process. As the complexity of financial intermediation on a worldwide scale
continues to increase, the conventional regulatory examination process will become
progressively obsolescent – at least for the more complex banking systems.” Engdahl
(2008, IV) comment says: „Under the Greenspan Fed, the foxes would be trusted to guard
the henhouse.”
For the time being let’s accept two broad statements. Firstly, market participants are
sometimes prone to speculative manias which lead to build-up of asset price bubbles.
Secondly, proper regulation and supervision may reduce the risk and severity of a financial
crisis. Given that, it is more important for the subject of this paper whether there are any
economic, in particular monetary, conditions which would be propitious to financial
imbalances.
According to Minsky, a financial crisis is triggered by a factor or an event that is
called a displacement. A displacement occurs when investors get excited about
something—an invention, such as railroads or the internet, or a war, or a major change of
economic policy. It also might be a change in the way the financial market operates; an
invention of new financial instruments or changes in the regulatory framework. 
What is particularly interesting Minsky (1982: 162) points out that „the relations
upon which the monetary authorities base their operations are predicted upon the
assumption that a given set of institutions and usages exist. If the operations of the
authorities have side effects in that they induce changes in financial institutions and
usages, then the relations shift. As a result, the side effects of monetary operation can be
quite different from those desired”. 
In fact, Minsky in his work not only points out at a spectacular event being
a displacement but also at „prosperity” being a product of expansionary policy as a milieu
where lending booms and speculation thrive. This is an important aspect of his financial
instability hypothesis. „The first theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that the
economy has financing regimes under which it is stable, and financing regimes in which
it is unstable. The second theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that over
periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that make
for a stable system to financial relations that make for an unstable system. In particular,
over a protracted period of good times capitalist economies tend to move from a financial
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of units engaged in speculative and Ponzi finance”1 Minsky (1992: 7–8).
It seems that both factors – a displacement and prosperity – matter. In the case of the
dot.com bubble, for example, it was the development of new technologies which made
investors exited but it was also time of „prosperity” – a long period of low interest rates
and credit boom. Sometimes it is, however, difficult to identify an incentive for „irrational
exuberance” in a particular category of assets. It is not obvious, at least not to me at this
stage of research, why the present crisis was rooted in mortgage lending. Anyway, in full
consistency with Minsky’s hypothesis (even though we may use different terminology)
the boom led to very high leverage.
These remarks are not very far from a statement that monetary policy may create
conditions which are propitious to the development of financial imbalances. This idea is
openly expressed by White (2006: 1): „(…) persistently easy monetary conditions can
lead to the cumulative build-up over time of significant deviations from historical norms
– whether in terms of debt levels, saving ratios, asset prices or other indicators of
„imbalances” The historical record indicates that mean reversion is a common outcome,
with associated negative implications for future aggregate demand.” 
The same idea is presented by Borio and Lowe (2002: 22): „(…) low and possibly
falling inflation together with a high degree of credibility of monetary policy would give
little reason for the authorities to tighten policy if they respond only to clear signs of
inflationary pressures. Paradoxically, (…) endogenous responses to credible monetary
policy increase the probability that latent inflation pressures manifest themselves in the
development of imbalances in the financial system, rather than immediate upward
pressure on higher goods and services price inflation. Failure to respond to these
imbalances, either using monetary policy or another policy instrument, may ultimately
increase the risk of both financial instability and subsequently deflation.” It seems that the
earlier mentioned „side effects of monetary operation” by Minsky have very much in
common with „endogenous responses to credible monetary policy” by Borio and Lowe.
The suggestion by Borio and Lowe that monetary policy may be a reason for financial
distress and that it should respond to imbalances even though goods and services prices
remain stable is a good starting point to the next part of the paper, which presents this issue
in more detail. 
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7). 2. Should monetary policy contradict asset price booms?
The opinion that monetary policy should consider financial stability as a target
independent from price stability and that failure to respond to financial imbalances may
be a reason for a crisis is not generally accepted at all. In particular, it does not seem to
have been shared by the Fed policymakers. Acontradictory view, that central banks should
restrict from manipulating asset prices, used to be called „Greenspan’s doctrine”. This is
well expressed by Bernanke and Gertler (2000: 45): „In brief, it is that flexible
inflation-targeting provides an effective, unified framework for achieving both general
macroeconomic stability and financial stability. Given a strong commitment to stabilizing
expected inflation, it is neither necessary nor desirable for monetary policy to respond to
changes in asset prices, except to the extent that they help to forecast inflationary or
deflationary pressures.” Bernanke and Gertler (2000: 14) justify this opinion claiming
that „a key advantage of the inflation-targeting framework is that it induces policymakers
to automatically adjust interest rates in a stabilizing direction in the face of asset price
instability or other financial disturbances. The logic is straightforward; since asset price
increases stimulate aggregate demand and asset price declines reduce it, the strong focus
of inflation targeters on stabilizing aggregate demand will result in „leaning against the
wind” – raising interest rates as asset prices rise and reducing them when they fall.” This
straightforward logic is, however, only a pure academic speculation which not necessarily
– and not in fact – has much to do with the reality. It is not only against other professional
opinions – such as that by Borio and Lowe above – but it is first of all in a sharp
contradiction to the experience of many cases of a financial distress, including the present
crisis. Moreover, this false opinion is a corner-stone of a formal model presented by
Bernanke and Gertler (2000) which „scientifically” justifies no need to react in an
independent manner to financial market imbalances. A good comment would be
a quotation from Engdahl (2007, I): „Greenspan has (...) safely retired, written his
memoirs and handed the control (and blame) of the mess to a young ex-Princeton
professor, Ben Bernanke. As a Princeton graduate, I can only say I would never trust
monetary policy for the world’s most powerful central bank in the hands of a Princeton
economics professor. Keep them in their ivy-covered towers.”
Another argument against activist policy targeted at financial stability is alleged
impossibility to differentiate between a bubble and fundamentally sound growth of asset
prices. Some difficulties or doubts might exist but economists are not hopeless in this
respect – for example, some methods are suggested in the above quotation of Borio and
Lowe, a fairly extensive presentations of useful indices contain (EBC, 2005). However,
Bernanke and Gertler (2000: 7) argue that „because „fundamental discount rate” is not
directly observable, it is in general impossible to know whether there is a non-fundamental
component in the current stock price.”
Similar opinion on the role of monetary policy to prevent asset bubbles and financial
instability is presented by Bordo et al. (2000: 27), who write „that a monetary regime that
produces aggregate price stability will, as a by-product, tend to promote stability of the
financial system”.
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experience of the present crisis and the economic situation in the years and months
preceding. However, this experience is not a unique precedent at all. Also
recommendations for monetary policy to counter build-up of financial imbalances are not
a recent idea. Borio and Lowe (2002: 1) maintained that „in principle, safeguards in the
financial sphere, in the form of prudential regulation and supervision, might be sufficient
to prevent financial distress. In practice, however, they may be less than fully satisfactory.
If the imbalances are large enough, the end-result could be a severe recession coupled
with price deflation. While such imbalances can be difficult to identify ex ante, the results
presented in this paper provide some evidence that useful measures can be developed.
This suggests that, despite the difficulties involved, a monetary policy response to
imbalances as they build up may be both possible and appropriate in some circumstances.”
Looking at the problem from a specific perspective also White (2006a, 2006) gives
his support to monetary policy which reacts to symptoms of financial imbalances. White
argues that price stabilization which tries to avoid periods of deflation (what is
characteristic for definitions of price stability as a central bank’s target) sometimes may
be too expansionary and it may lead to an asset price bubble. This may happen in
a situation of „good deflation” when prices decrease as an effect of some positive supply
shocks such as rapid growth of productivity or – as recently – globalization. However, it
is interesting in this context to ask to what degree monetary policy should be more
accommodative in case of „bad deflation” – one induced by a financial crisis and falling
demand – without risking it may turn out to have been too easy. This problem will be
considered in the next part of the paper.
In spite of its clear commitment to price stability (in a manner criticized by White)
also ECB (2005) was in favor of a monetary policy reactive to financial imbalances. The
reaction postulated should follow a strategy of leaning against the wind where „the central
bank would adopt a somewhat tighter policy stance in the face of an inflating asset market
than it would otherwise allow if confronted with a similar macroeconomic outlook under
more normal market conditions. In this way a central bank would, already at an earlier
stage of market dynamics, err on the side of caution in trying to avoid feeding the bubble
with an accommodative policy. It would thus tolerate a certain deviation from its price
stability objective in the shorter term in exchange for enhanced prospects of preserving
price and economic stability in the future” (ECB, 2005: 58). Such policy should also help
avoid too late reaction which would only „prick the bubble” and thus would trigger
a crisis. 
An interesting solution in the spirit of leaning against the wind has been applied by
the Bank of Spain since 2000. Now it is subject to much interest of other central banks
and financial institutions. However, it is an instrument of regulatory and not monetary
(interest rate) policy. „The central idea behind Spain’s system is to smooth economic
peaks and troughs by acting countercyclically. During times of economic growth, the
system forces banks to set aside a provision for each new loan in case it goes bad. The
theory is that the additional cost will limit excessive growth in lending, as well as force
banks to build up a cushion against future losses” (Catan and House, 2008).
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to financial imbalances may as well pertain to the exchange rate. It is characteristic in
this case, however, that a bubble – overvaluation – might be a result of persistently tight
and not lax monetary policy. White (2006: 6–7) claims that „monetary tightening in the
interests of reducing inflationary pressures could, in some cases, lead to a degree of
nominal and real appreciation that would significantly worsen the current account balance.
This could increase the likelihood of a future exchange rate crisis (...).” 
3. Monetary policy reaction to a financial crisis
There are two aspects of a major financial crisis; firstly, a fast and deep fall in asset
prices and, secondly, financial instability – a risk of a breakdown of the financial system
due to bankruptcy of financial institutions of the systemic importance or disorganization
of an important segments of the financial market. A general outcome is usually credit
crunch and economic stagnation or recession. It is widely accepted that central bank’s
role is not to exert an impact on asset prices but to protect the financial system and the
financial market from a systemic collapse and to prompt economic recovery. According
to Mishkin and White (2002: 16) „financial instability is the key problem facing the
policymaker and not stock market crashes, even if they reflect the bursting of an asset
price bubble. If the balance sheets of financial institutions are initially strong, then a stock
market crash (bursting of a bubble) is unlikely to lead to financial instability. In this case,
the effect of a stock market crash on the economy will operate through the usual wealth
and cost of capital channels, only requiring the monetary policymakers to respond to the
standard effects of stock market decline on aggregate demand.” The problem is, however,
that asset price bubbles are typically accompanied by excessive lending and leverage,
risky investment and weak balance sheets of financial and non-financial, debtor
institutions. How much influence asset prices can have on financial stability depends also
on some technical aspects of the problem, for example the relative importance of
OTC/exchange traded instruments; they are not discussed in this paper.
It is thus typical that bursting of an asset price bubble demands some involvement of
the central bank beyond its commitment to maintain price stability or its intent to bar
aggregate demand from falling. In such a juncture the central bank acts as a lender of last
resort. Although this role of a central bank is essentially uncontroversial, during serious
crises it can be addressed towards many financial institutions, take huge amounts of
bail-out and become eventually a vast infusion of liquidity to the economy, without much
respect to considerations other than avoiding the pending financial catastrophe. Such
activity is certainly beyond monetary policymakers response to „the standard effects of
stock market decline on aggregate demand.” Unfortunately, these efforts may not be very
effective in promoting economic recovery, even when they take the form of quantitative
easing, as in Japan. 
In ECB’s (2005: 58) opinion „one argument in favour of a policy of „leaning against
the wind” is symmetry”. This is most welcome as a postulate but when it comes to a crisis
it seems there is no much room for symmetry. Moreover, even when anti-bubble
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policymaker may be reluctant to raise interest rates. „In any event, any asset price
„misalignments” are difficult to identify and cannot be effectively resisted since that
would require interest rate increases that would be destructive elsewhere in the economy.
Conversely, any slowdown in economic activity associated with an asset price „bust” can
be effectively resisted through an easing of monetary policy. This could impart a degree
of asymmetry to the conduct of domestic monetary policy in the face of such
disturbances„(White, 2006: 11). This quotation clearly presents why monetary policy
tends to be asymmetric. I would only add and repeat that easing would rather not be very
effective in promoting economic growth; the central bank, however, supplies abundant
liquidity also for the reasons of financial stability.
What might be longer-term results of such loosening of monetary policy? A good
answer to this question is given by White (2006: 13–14) who claims that „lower interest
rates can enhance „search for yield”. This will particularly be the case for financial
institutions (like insurance companies and defined benefit pension funds) that must hit
predetermined hurdle rates. This both induces investors to purchase increasingly risky
assets, and to use increased leverage to raise rates of return on equity. Such behavior
becomes manifest in reductions in risk premium on lower-rated paper and sovereigns,
and on the increased availability of low cost finance to support venture capital investments
and to purchase asset-backed securities. On the one hand, this encourages aggregate
spending and investment as desired. On the other hand, should certain sectors be
particularly favorably affected (...) this could set the scene for another burst of
credit-fuelled misallocations further down the line.” 
It seems that the policy of the Fed provides a particularly good example of the
mistakes a central bank can make with regard to financial crises. First of all, as presented
in the second part of the paper, the Fed promoted hasty liberalization and gave up an
effective supervision over financial institutions. Moreover, „Greenspan’s doctrine” which
opposed any reaction to build-up of asset price bubbles went hand in hand with big and
lasting reductions of interest rates after a bubble has burst; for example, low interest rates
are believed to have fed the dot.com bubble. The bursting of the bubble and the attack of
9/11 also made the Fed lower its interest rates in the years 2001–2004 which can be
considered as an important factor behind the build-up of imbalances unveiled during the
present crisis. The policy was clearly asymmetric. When policy tightening eventually
came it was rather abrupt and not justified in goods and services prices inflation. It seems
that against the doctrine the policy reacted to asset price inflation and „irrational
exuberance”. However, coming too late such a policy shift could only „prick” a bubble.
This was the case of policy tightening before March 2000, when internet crisis began,
and then when interest rate hikes started in the second half of 2004. All these mistakes
were accompanied by strong moral hazard in big financial institutions (and after the
liberalization only big ones thrived). 
The way the present crisis is managed is based on liquidity injection on the scale not
seen ever before. Only between August and November 2008 the Fed’s balance grew from
900 billion USD to 2,2 trillion USD. In November 2008 the Fed announced new projects
which are to boost the monetary base by another 800 billion USD; the Fed decided to
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500 billion USD of their mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and it created Term
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facilities (TALF) of 200 billion USD which is to lend
against a collateral of ABS (asset-backed securities) backed by newly originated consumer
and small business loans. In February 2009 the amount of TALF resources was increased
to 1 trillion USD. TALF is to realize the aims of Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
passed earlier last year by the Congress – the money was, however, used mainly to bail-out
troubled financial institutions. Press comments are not necessarily enthusiastic; „Under
the guise of successive new programmes, each with a less memorable acronym than the
last, the Fed is substituting its balance-sheet for that of the contracting private financial
system to keep the American economy from being starved of credit.” „The MBS
purchases are significant; for the first time they turn the Fed into a direct lender to
consumers. Many homeowners, though they do not know it, will be sending their monthly
mortgage payments to the Fed” (Economist, 2008).
On March 18th, 2009 the FED announced that it would purchase 300 billion USD in
Treasury debt (what is monetization of huge public deficits and raises questions about
future independence of the FED), it would boost its purchases of MBSs to 1.25 trillion
USD from previously declared 500 billion USD and it will buy 200 billion USD of debt
issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and not 100 billion USD as announced in
November 2008. These steps taken by the Fed are examples of quantitative easing after
nominal Fed funds rate has been cut virtually to zero. Money is for nothing, and the Fed
is „pushing the string” now. 
Some other central banks are also eager to get credit flowing with the use of
quantitative easing. The Bank of England announced on March 5th, 2009 that it would buy
government securities and private assets for 75 billion pounds (105 billion USD). 
The reaction to the crisis by the Fed and the American Treasury were aimed at
absorbing troubled assets from the private financial sector, helping financial institutions
to reduce their leverage, restoring confidence, reducing premia and yields and making
credit flow again. To a degree they were successful – yields and premia declined and there
was more confidence in the market. What concerns the „strategic” aims these activities
do not seem to be very effective. Money is sticking in financial institutions instead of
fuelling new lending and boosting the economy. „But precious little of (...) additional
liquidity is finding its way through to households and corporate borrowers. In fact, most
of it is now sloshing around the banking system like so much excess ballast. Banks have
increase their reserve holdings on deposit with the Fed from $8 billion to $494 billion.
This is $488 billion more than the Fed estimates they would ordinarily need for payment
clearing and prudential purposes” (Kemp, 2008).
The fact that this money remains idle may reflect an approach to the economy of
households, firms and – eventually – financial institutions more realistic than that of the
central bank. If the economy has been choked with cheap and too easily accessible credit
it does not seem that even more credit is a solution. Of course, preventing the financial
system from a collapse and viable firms from bankruptcy due to credit crunch, although
not without costs, is a reasonable policy. It is also true that negative market sentiment
may be self-fulfilling. When most of the agents decide rightly to cut their excessive
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make agents to economize even harder. This is a non-optimal Nash – and Keynes –
equilibrium. It is thus advisable that the economic policy try to change these pessimistic
sentiments. It may use fiscal instruments for that purpose and a reasonably easy monetary
stance might help as well. Restrictive monetary policy would aggravate problems. With
regard to the Great Depression this last statement is subject to Friedman-Schwartz
hypothesis which claims that the depression was so deep and long because monetary
policy was not accommodative enough. Having said this I am still convinced that flooding
the economy with money, bailing-out fraudulent and irresponsible financial institutions,
their managers and stock-holders, keeping alive „zombie” firms and offering more credit
to „ninja„(no income, no job, no assets) households is not the right policy. Hopefully,
financial institutions and firms are now more cautious then some central bankers and they
are afraid to lose more money even though it is virtually for nothing – but still to be repaid.
One may expect, also households should realize their true creditworthiness. 
What is going to happen with this enormous amount of high-powered, idle money
when the economic situation calms down? Is it going to fuel another „search for yield”
and boost another bubble? Or probably in a changed environment it is going to spur goods
and services inflation. In theory, this money could be also „mopped” back by the central
bank. In practice, it is now difficult to imagine. This monetary hangover becomes a reason
for anxiety which is also expressed in the press: „Having expanded its balance-sheet so
rapidly, the Fed may not have the foresight or courage to shrink it fast enough once the
crisis passes, and the extra liquidity could fuel an overheating economy” (Economist,
2008).
These risk are now recognized by the academia and central bankers. Issing (2009)
writes that „at a closer look the ‘Jackson Hole Consensus” raises further questions. Even
if the mop up strategy might work initially, by exactly doing ‘its job” in a financial crisis
of limited dimension, because of its asymmetric character it may lay the ground for the
next bubble and crisis (and so on)”2. Unfortunately, under the stress no one seems to care. 
Conclusions
Without any respect to elegant, academic theories market participants are not fully
rational and markets are not efficient. Periodically there are speculative manias and asset
price bubbles grow and burst. Good regulation and effective supervision may considerably
make these phenomena less probable or less severe. Monetary policy has its role to play
to preserve financial stability, too. Anew paradigm for monetary policy is still subject to
a debate, such as during the 7th BIS Annual Conference „Whither Monetary Policy?
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2 „(...) re  stric  ting the ro  le of the cen  tral bank to a to  tal  ly pas  si  ve ro  le in the pe  riod of the bu  ilt  -up of
a bub ble  and  prac ti cal ly  pre -an no un cing  its  ro le  as  the  „sa vio ur”  on ce  the  bub ble  bur sts  re pre sents  an
asym  me  tric ap  pro  ach which mi  ght im  ply the risk of cre  ating mo  ral ha  zard with ac  tors dri  ving the de  ve  -
lop  ment of as  set pri  ces.
What can be cal  led the „Jack  son Ho  le Con  sen  sus” (…) is exac  tly this” (Is  sing, 2009). Monetary Policy Challenges in the Decade Ahead” in June 2008. Anyway, it seems clear
that „Jackson Hole Consensus” has lost its” appeal.
Easy monetary conditions may result in excessive lending and financial imbalances
even though there is no inflation. Creation of money and credit in the economy should not
develop without necessary regulation and surveillance and also without a significant cost
of reserve money. Unfortunately, monetary policy focused only on price stability does
not guaranty proper conditions as it often turns out to fuel excessive credit expansion.
However, the worst problems with keeping money under control might arise during
a financial crisis. Once monetary policy is eased and liquidity is expanded enormously,
it may be difficult to tighten and mop it up, respectively. Such monetary easing may be
a precondition for the next crisis. Shortly speaking, money must always remain a scarce
resource. However trivial this statement is, monetary policy of some central banks seems
to miss the point. 
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Stresz cze nie
Ar ty kuł  wska zu je,  jak  po li ty ka  pie nięż na,  któ rej  ce lem  jest  wy łącz nie  sta bil ność  cen
to wa rów  i usług,  mo że  przy czy nić  się  do  roz wo ju  in fla cji  ak ty wów  i – osta tecz nie  – do  kry -
zy su  fi nan so we go.  Ry zy ko  to  jest  szcze gól nie  wy so kie,  gdy  sek tor  fi nan so wy  nie  jest  pod -
da ny  wła ści wym  re gu la cjom  i sku tecz ne mu  nad zo ro wi.  Po chop na  li be ra li za cja,  lek ce wa -
że nie  zna cze nia  urzę do we go  nad zo ru  oraz  „dok try na  Gre en spa na”,  któ ra  ne go wa ła  po -
trze bę  uwzględ nie nia  sta bil no ści  fi nan so wej  w spo so bie  pro wa dze nia  po li ty ki  pie nięż nej
cha rak te ry zo wa ły  po li ty kę  FED  skut ku ją cą  kry zy sem  fi nan so wym.  Ar ty kuł  ana li zu je  tak -
że  zna cze nie  po li ty ki  pie nięż nej  dla  za rzą dza nia  kry zy sem.  W re ak cji  na  kry zys  na stę pu -
je  ob niż ka  stóp  pro cen to wych  oraz  udzie le nie  po mo cy  sys te mo wo  waż nym  in sty tu cjom  fi -
nan so wym,  któ re  tra cą  płyn ność.  Ta ka  po li ty ka,  zwłasz cza  je śli  pro wa dzo na  zbyt  dłu go
i zbyt  ra dy kal nie  uła twia ją ca  do stęp  do  pie nią dza  ban ku  cen tral ne go,  nie  tyl ko  ro dzi  po -
ku sę  nad uży cia,  lecz  tak że  po wo du je  ko lej ną  fa lę  „po go ni  za  zy skiem”  i przy czy nia  się  do
na ra sta nia  ko lej nej  spe ku la cyj nej  bań ki.  W kon se kwen cji  po li ty ka  pie nięż na  sta je  się  asy -
me trycz na  i pro cy klicz na.  Re ak cja  FED  na  ostat ni  kry zys  fi nan so wy  po zo sta je  w zgo dzie
z tym  wzor cem  ty po wym  dla  po li ty ki  FED  w prze szło ści.  Tym  ra zem  wszak że  ska la  za si -
le nia  go spo dar ki  w płyn ność  oraz  wy ni ka ją ce go  stąd  ry zy ka  nie rów no wa gi  na  ryn kach  fi -
nan so wych  w przy szło ści  są  bez pre ce den so we.  Pod sta wo wym  wnio skiem,  ja ki  pły nie  z te -
go  ar ty ku łu,  jest  opi nia,  że  nie  jest  moż li we  utrzy ma nie  sta bil ne go  sys te mu  fi nan so we go
oraz  zdro wej  go spo dar ki,  je śli  pie niądz  nie  jest  za so bem  rzad kim.  Jak kol wiek  try wial ne
mo że  się  wy da wać  ta kie  stwier dze nie,  współ cze śnie  waż ne  ban ki  cen tral ne,  z FED  na  cze -
le, dzia  ła  ją wbrew tej opi  nii. 
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